We investigate macroeconomic ‡uctuations in the Mediterranean basin, their similarities and convergence. A model with four indicators, roughly covering the West, the East and the Middle East and the North Africa portions of the Mediterranean, characterizes well the historical experience since the early 1980. Idiosyncratic causes still dominate domestic cyclical ‡uctuations in many countries. Convergence and divergence coexist in the area, are local and transitory. The cyclical outlook for the next few years looks rosier for the East blocks than for the West.
Introduction
The nature and the transmission properties of business cycles have dramatically changed since the early 1980s. On the one hand, emerging market economies now play an important role in shaping world business cycles, previously determined by a handful of developed countries. On the other, trade and …nancial linkages have increased, making international spillovers potentially much more relevant than in the past. While Latin America and Asia are leading examples of these new tendencies, it is largely unexplored whether the Mediterranean basin conforms to these international trends. The issue is relevant from at least three di¤erent perspectives. and Bildirici (2010) among others, have studied whether business cycles around the world are converging or decoupling, in the sense that cyclical di¤erences are becoming more profound. The conventional wisdom suggests that increased cross-border interdependences should lead to convergence of business cycle ‡uctuations. Greater openness to trade and increased …nancial and migration ‡ows should, in fact, make economies more sensitive to external shocks and increase the comovements of domes-tic and foreign variables by expanding or intensifying the channels through which shocks spill across countries. An alternative view indicates that increased economic integration could lead to more asynchronous output ‡uctuations, as countries specialize in the production of goods for which they have comparative advantage, and freely trade them in the world markets. Thus, production cycles could become completely idiosyncratic while consumption cycles are perfectly correlated (see e.g. Heathcothe and Perri, 2004) . While the evidence on the issue is contradictory, investigators have noticed that business cycles around the world have become somewhat panels displaying country speci…c dynamics and cross country lagged interdependencies; it allows for time variations in the correlation structure across variables and countries; and it facilitates the construction of observable indicators capturing regional, national or exogenous in ‡uences Finally, it is well suited to study the international transmission of shocks from one country or area to another.
We uncover three main facts. Cyclical ‡uctuations in the Mediterranean are heterogeneous. On the one hand, regional factors are important and the dynamics of the regional indicators di¤er in terms of volatility, persistence and synchronicity.
Interestingly, trade openness, the level of development or the monetary arrangement a country chooses do not seem to be crucial in determining how cyclical ‡uctuations should be grouped; instead geographical proximity matters. On the other, the relative importance of regional factors for domestic ‡uctuations is far from uniform across countries and variables and idiosyncratic in ‡uences dominate the dynamics of macroeconomic variables in several countries. Thus, cyclical ‡uctuations in the Mediterranean are quite di¤erent from those observed in other regions of the world.
Second, increased regional interdependences have not changed much these features. If we exclude the recent recession, there is little evidence that the relative importance of country speci…c and idiosyncratic factors declines over time; as a matter of fact, time variations after 1995 are close to negligible. Hence, recent policies actions have not reduced much the segmented nature of domestic business cycles.
Third, time variations in the structure of regional business cycles are not easily reconciled with either a pure convergence or a pure decoupling view. Both phenomena appear to be present, but more importantly, both appear to be local and temporary. Absent some major structural change, even regional convergence seems to be di¢ cult to achieve: GDP growth will be persistently below its national average in the major EU countries, while countries in the east side of the Mediterranean will return to above average growth rates. For the rest of the countries, GDP growth will settle at the historical mean level, therefore excluding the possibility of repeating the exceptional growth experienced in the last decade in North Africa.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the empirical model and section 3 the data. Section 4 presents the results, section 5 reports some robustness checks and section 6 concludes.
The empirical model
The empirical model employed in the analysis has the form:
where i = 1; :::; N indicates countries, t = 1; :::; T time, and L the lag operator; y it is a G 1 vector for each i and Y t = (y 0 1t ; : : : y 0 N t ) 0 ; D it;j are G N G matrices for each lag j = 1; : : : ; p, F it;j are G M matrices each lag j = 1; : : : ; q; W it is a M 1 vector of exogenous variables, e it a G 1 vector of disturbances with variance i . Model (1) displays three important features, which makes it ideal for our study.
First, dynamic relationships are allowed to be country speci…c. Without such a feature, similarities could not be evaluated, heterogeneity biases may be present, and economic conclusions easily distorted. Second, whenever the N G N G matrix
0 , is not block diagonal for some L, cross-unit lagged interdependencies matter. Thus, dynamic feedback across countries are possible and this greatly expands the type of interactions our empirical model can account for. Third, the coe¢ cients are allowed to vary over time. Absent time variations, it would be di¢ cult to study convergence and to examine the evolution of business cycles characteristics. These features add realism to the empirical model and avoid important speci…cation errors (see , for a discussion), but they have a cost. To see why, rewrite (1) in regression format as:
where However, even if t = ; 8t, its sheer dimensionality (there are k = N Gp + M q parameters in each equation) prevents any meaningful unconstrained estimation.
The factorization of the coe¢ cient vector t
To circumvent this problem, rather than estimating the vector t ; we estimate a lower dimensional vector t , which determines t . Let
where is a matrix of zeros and ones, dim( t ) << dim( t ), and u t is a vector of disturbances, capturing unmodelled features in the coe¢ cient vector t . For example, the speci…cations we consider in the paper have t = 1 1t + 2 2t + 3 3t where 1 ; 2 ; 3 are loading matrices of dimensions N Gk s, N Gk N , N Gk G; respectively; 1t ; 2t ; 3t are mutually orthogonal factors capturing, respectively, movements in the coe¢ cient vector which are common across s groups of countries and variables; movements which are country speci…c; and movements which are variable speci…c.
Factoring t as in (3) is advantageous in many respects. Computationally, it reduces the problem of estimating N Gk coe¢ cients into the one of estimating, for example, s + N + G factors characterizing their dynamics. Practically, the factorization (3) transforms an overparametrized panel VAR into a parsimonious SUR model, where the regressors are averages of certain right-hand side VAR variables. To see this, substitute (3) into (2) to have
where Z t = Z t and v t = E t + Z t u t . Economically, the decomposition in (4) is convenient since it allows us to decompose ‡uctuations in Y t , measure the relative importance, e.g., of common and country speci…c and exogenous in ‡uences, and study their time evolution. For example, when t has at least two dimensions, To complete the speci…cation we need to describe the evolution of t over time and the features of its time zero distribution. We let
with B t = 1 B t 1 + 2 B, where 1 ; 2 are scalars, and B is block diagonal. We set = , V = 2 I k ; and let E t , u t and t be mutually independent.
In (5) the factors evolve over time as random walks -we choose this speci…cation, after experimenting with various candidate law of motions since it is parsimonious and allows to …t the data very well. The spherical assumption on V re ‡ects the fact that the factors have similar units, while setting = is standard (see e.g. Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1997) . The variance of t is allowed to be time varying (following Canova, 1993) to account for generic volatility clustering in Y t . Time invariant structures ( 1 = 2 = 0), and homoskedastic variances ( 1 = 0 and 2 = 1) are special cases of the assumed process. The block diagonality of B guarantees orthogonality of the factors, which is preserved a-posteriori, and hence their identi…ability. Finally, independence among the errors is standard.
To summarize, our estimable empirical model has the state space structure:
The structure of (6)- (7) di¤ers from the one commonly used in the time varying coe¢ cient literature -typically, the variance of v t , rather than the variance of t , is time varying. However, in a reduced form sense, the two speci…cations are equivalent. Thus, our speci…cation can also capture volatility changes in the endogenous variables and has two advantages over alternative setups: it allows for time variations in the shocks of the loadings and in the reduced form errors to be correlated (as it is done, e. g., in ARCH-Models); computationally, it is far less burdensome. While the model (6)- (7) can be estimated both with classical and Bayesian methods, the latter approach is preferable since the exact small sample distribution of the objects of interest can be obtained, even with small T and N (see Del Negro and Schorfheide, forthcoming, for a hierarchical interpretation of this structure).
Prior information
To compute posterior distributions for the parameters of (6), we assume prior densities for 0 = ( 1 ; B; 0 ) and let 2 ; 1 ; 2 be known. We set B i = b i I; i = 1; : : : ; r, where b i controls the tightness of factor i in the coe¢ cient vector, and make The values used are: 1 = 1:0; 2 = 0; z 1 = N G+5; Q 1 =Q 1 ; $ 0 = S 0 = 1:0; 0 =^ 0 and R 0 = I r . HereQ 1 = diag (Q 11 ; :::; Q 1N ) and Q 1i is the estimated covariance matrix of the time invariant version for each country VAR;^ 0 is obtained with OLS on a time invariant version of (1) over the entire sample, and r is the dimension of t .
Since the in-sample …t improves if 2 ! 0, an exact factorization of t is used.
Posterior distributions
To calculate the posterior distribution for = (
, we combine the prior with the likelihood of the data, which is proportional to
where 
where tjT and R tjT are the smoothed one-period-ahead forecasts of t and of the variance-covariance matrix of the forecast error, calculated as in Chib and Greenberg (1995) ,
Under regularity conditions (see Geweke, 2000) , cycling through the conditional distributions in (9) produces in the limit draws from the joint posterior. From these, the marginal distributions of t can be computed averaging over draws in the nuisance dimensions and, as a by-product, the posterior distributions of our indicators can be obtained. For example, a credible 90% interval for the common indicator is obtained ordering the h = 1; : : : ; H draws of W LI h t for each t and taking the 5th and the 95th percentile. We have performed standard convergence checks: increasing the length of the chain; splitting the chains in pieces after a burn-in period and calculating whether the mean and the variances are similar; checking if cumulative means settle to some value. The results we present are based on chains with 400000 draws: 2000 blocks of 200 draws were made and the last draw for each block is retained. Hence, 2000 draws are used for posterior inference at each t.
Once the posterior distribution of t is available , one can easily construct the posterior distribution of the indicators Z jt jt and of their components, and with (6)- (7) compute the average fraction of the ‡uctuations in Y t due to each indicator, the responses of the indicators to particular shocks and predictive densities for future Y t+i : Given the nature of our model, impulse responses are computed as the di¤erence between two conditional expectations, one generated assuming that a subset of the v t is equal to 1 at t and zero afterwards and one generated assuming that v t is zero at all t -for details see The exogenous variables of the system, all entering contemporaneously in the VAR, are the world real GDP and the US federal funds rate, both provided by the WEO. After some experimentation, oil prices were not included because they are highly correlated with the world GDP measure and thus induce near-collinearity in the system. All the variables of the system are demeaned and standardized prior to estimation. This makes the equal weighting scheme in (6)- (7) and the analysis coherent.
Some features of the Mediterranean economies
Before proceeding with the analysis, we present some facts about the less known In sum, trade in goods, remittances and tourism could be important channels through which ‡uctuations could be transmitted across countries in the region.
Given the nature of the ‡ows, cyclical conditions in the EU may be an important factor for domestic ‡uctuations in each of the non-EU Mediterranean countries, while the intra non-EU spillovers are likely to be small. An interesting question is whether remittances and tourism are su¢ cient to make cyclical ‡uctuations in countries facing di¤erent types of shocks alike. Similarly, one would like to know whether the increased interdependences over the last decade have changed the nature of ‡uctuations in the area or whether regional and national factors still dominate. Table A .1 in the appendix presents a few cyclical statistics for the variables we used in the investigation. Overall, there appears to be substantial di¤erences in the unconditional moments we report. In addition, di¤erences do not seem to be easily reconciled with the institutional or development indicators used in the literature. In the next sections, we dig deeper into these issues with our panel-VAR model.
The results
The presentation of the results is organized around three main themes (similarities of cyclical ‡uctuations; relative importance of exogenous, regional and idiosyncratic factors in explaining the ‡uctuations; convergence over time of ‡uctuations) each of which is dealt in a separate subsection.
Are cyclical ‡uctuations alike?
To start with, we examine whether business cycles in the Mediterranean basin are similar and, if not, what kind of characteristics matter for grouping cyclical ‡uctu-ations in the area. To this end, we estimate a number of models, allowing 1t ; the common factor in the coe¢ cient vector to have one, two, three or four dimensions.
To be precise, all models we consider have 16 country-speci…c, 3 variable-speci…c factors in the coe¢ cient vector, thus acknowledging the possibility these in ‡uences may be present in the data, but di¤er in the speci…cation of the common factor structure. In the baseline model, the common factor is a scalar; in the alternative models, it has more dimensions. Hence, the baseline model would give a good …t if cyclical ‡uctuations in the basin were similar; the alternatives would be preferable if ‡uctuations cluster around two, three or four di¤erent poles of attraction. Since there are many ways to assign the coe¢ cients of the variables of the 16 countries into groups, we follow Canova (2004) , and informally examine di¤erent combinations of countries into groups when the common factor features two, three or four dimensions. Among all combinations we tried, we report in Table 1 a subset which possess two characteristics: groups have some reasonable economic interpretation; the …t of the model -as measured by the marginal likelihood -is good.
The marginal likelihood, which we compute using an harmonic mean estimator, is akin to an R 2 , and tells us which speci…cation is more successful in explaining insample ‡uctuations of the endogenous variables. Thus, for a given number of groups, the higher is the marginal likelihood of a particular assignment to groups, the better is the in-sample …t. To formally evaluate the goodness of …t across speci…cations which di¤er either in the assignment to the groups, for a given number of groups, or in the number of groups, one needs a loss function. With a standard 0-1 loss function, log di¤erences of 2.2 (4) will make a model signi…cantly (de…nitively) worse.
The …t a model with one common factor is inferior to the …t of all other models and di¤erences are de…nitively signi…cant. Thus, ‡uctuations are not alike in the Mediterranean basin. However, it is somewhat more di¢ cult to decide how many clubs should be allowed for and along which dimension cyclical ‡uctuations should be clustered around. A model where the common factor has four dimensions is preferable to a model where the common factor has two dimensions but di¤erences between models with three and four common factors are small. Interestingly, taking the number of groups as given, the best …tting speci…cations have nice economic interpretations. For example, the best speci…cation obtained when the common factor has two dimensions is one that loads one factor on the 
The dynamic patterns of regional indicators
To understand the structure of the regional cycles we uncover and to highlight in what way they are di¤erent, Figure 1 Since some countries in the block are oil and gas exporters, one may conjecture that the persistent increase in oil and natural gas prices in the 2000s has something to do with this pattern. We do not …nd such an explanation compelling since not all the countries in the region enjoy these resources and since oil prices are highly correlated with the world GDP measure we use. Structural reforms, including more open access to internal markets, are more likely to be responsible for this pattern.
In sum, our approach clusters Mediterranean cycles around di¤erent (regional) poles of attraction because ‡uctuations in the basin are heterogeneous in terms of amplitude, duration, phase length and symmetry. In addition, while the features of regional cycles evolving, there is very little evidence that they become more similar over time and geographical proximity with the EU has, at least so far, little in ‡u-ence on the way non-EU Mediterranean economies behave over the cycle. The crisis of 2008 appears to have altered the nature of cyclical ‡uctuations in the Mediterranean basin, but, it is unclear whether stronger comovements herald a permanent structural break or are simply the result of a strong common shock.
What drives domestic ‡uctuations?
To answer this question, we report in Table 3 , for each country-variable pair, the average fraction of the volatility explained by the predetermined portion of the regional indicators (panel A) and the exogenous indicator, calculated as W LI In the East, the regional indicator has limited importance in explaining ‡uctua-tions of real GDP, consumption and investment growth, and almost no explanatory power for the trade balance to GDP and the TOTs growth, while idiosyncratic factors matter. For example, they dominate output ‡uctuations in Malta, consumption and investment ‡uctuations in Cyprus and output and consumption ‡uctuations in Albania. Turkey seems to be the exception and regional and idiosyncratic factors are equally explain ‡uctuations in output, consumption or investment growth.
In the Middle East, the average proportion of ‡uctuations explained by the regional indicator is low. In addition, idiosyncratic factors become more important as time goes by, at least for consumption and investment growth. In North Africa, cyclical ‡uctuations of output, consumption and investment growth are dominated by a combination of country speci…c and idiosyncratic in ‡uences but their relative importance changes over time. Interestingly, the regional indicator largely drives the growth miracle of the last decade, con…rming that institutional changes may be at the root of the convergence process. The regional indicator explains a slightly larger percentage of the ‡uctuations in the trade balance to GDP and in the TOTs growth in this region, but the numbers are still small.
The importance of exogenous factors in explaining ‡uctuations in output, consumption and investment growth is low. Thus, world economic conditions a¤ect basic macroeconomic variables only indirectly -via lags of the endogenous variables -rather than directly. Exogenous factors are however more important to explain ‡uctuations in the TOTs growth and in the trade balance to GDP ratio.
Taken together patterns stand in striking opposition with those reported in other parts of the world and go against the predictions of a number of models of the international business cycle. For example, the dichotomy we uncover, with consumption, investment and output growth primarily explained by endogenous factors and TOT growth and trade balance to GDP primarily explained by exogenous factors, imply sectorial segmentations and the presence of di¤erent types of shocks driving the dynamics of domestic variables. Moreover, the fact that in many countries idiosyncratic factors are more important for consumption than output growth makes it di¢ cult to rationalize cyclical ‡uctuations as optimal responses of risk averse agents to productivity shocks and highlights the potential role of (underground) remittances as sources of cyclical wedge between the two. The evidence is also di¢ cult to reconcile with the idea that TFP di¤erences are responsible for cross country cyclical di¤erences. In fact, output and consumption ‡uctuations are not driven by similar sources over the cross section, neither jointly nor separately. Finally, since the pre and post 1995 evidence is similar, and since trade links increased since 1995, one may question the role of trade in making Mediterranean cycles more interconnected.
Convergence or decoupling?
The question of whether cyclical ‡uctuations are converging or not has drawn a lot of attention in the literature, but the conclusion is still controversial. The evidence so far collected does not support either the convergence or the decoupling propositions -idiosyncratic sources of ‡uctuations matter for a number of countries, but their importance is neither systematically increasing nor systematically decreasing.
Further evidence on the issues is in …gure 5, which reports pairwise rolling correlations between the regional indicators. Rolling correlations are computed using Shocks originating in the West had di¤erent e¤ects on the North African in-dicator depending on the time period: responses …rst become stronger relative to the 1992 and then weaker -an initial process of convergence was aborted later on.
Consistently with the rolling correlations evidence, the responses of the East and the Middle East show similar patterns and, relative to 1992, the transmission from the West has weakened with the East and the Middle East equally a¤ected. Thus, regional interdependences are changing over time, but the changes are temporary and the direction of the changes is region speci…c. As far as we know, this pattern of convergence and divergence over time of di¤erent regions in an area has not been previously documented and calls into questions common explanations for the convergence/decoupling phenomena based on TFP or structural parameter di¤erences.
What is next?
How persistent are the patterns we have described? Should we expect them to continue? To shed light on future business cycle developments in Mediterranean we conduct a simple forecasting exercise: we use information up to 2010 to estimate the model and forecast assuming that during the prediction sample no shocks will hit either the variables or the estimated coe¢ cients and that the exogenous variables will take the values forecasted by the WEO. Our empirical model is well suited for this exercise and, as shown in Canova and Ciccarelli, 2009, it has good properties when compared with existing approaches. Figure 7 reports, for each country, the value of the real GDP growth up to 2010 and the 90 percent posterior credible forecast interval (the blue dashed lines) for 2011-2015. For comparison, we also plot WEO forecasts for the same horizons (red solid line) even though they di¤er in two important aspects: they include information up to the second quarter of 2011, which is not available in our annual model; they are based on country speci…c semi-structural models rather than a purely descriptive statistical multi-country model.
Our forecasts are close to those of the WEO and, for many countries, the qualitative features of the predictions coincide. For example, for the countries in the West region, the current stagnation is expected to last long and there is a non-negligible probability that the growth rate of real GDP in 2011-2015 will be below its mean value. The predictions for 2011-2012 are slightly rosier for Portugal and signi…cantly worse for Greece but di¤erences with the WEO are eliminated by 2013. In the East bloc, no double-dip recession is predicted and in some countries, such as Cyprus and Malta, growth is expected to be vigorous. Di¤erences with WEO forecasts are larger for this region and, for example, our forecasts are more bullish for Malta and Cyprus and more bearish for Turkey, at least for 2012. Thus, di¢ culties for East Mediterranean countries were quite transitory and real GDP is expected to revert to (above) normal growth rate in the future.
The forecasts for the Middle East region are generally less upbeat than those of the WEO and our model predicts that the growth rate of real GDP for these countries will revert to the average national level experienced over the past decade.
Finally, the forecast for the North Africa countries are mixed but it appears that the long positive di¤erential expansion these countries experienced in the last decade will end. Clearly, since our model conditions on the information available at the end of 2010, it misses the drop in GDP growth due to the popular uprising of the …rst part of 2011. On the other hand, the sustained growth pattern predicted by the WEO for Egypt and Tunisia in 2014-2015 rests on the assumption that structural reforms will achieve their goals, a scenario which is unquanti…able in our model.
To summarize, if the existing conditions continue unchanged into the future, the West will su¤er longer than the East, and the path of GDP growth in Western countries is expected to be below its national average for quite a while. In addition, the extraordinary expansion phase experienced by the North Africa region is likely to terminate. All in all, global convergence of GDP ‡uctuations is unlikely to take place in the basin in the years to come. But perhaps more importantly, even regional convergence seem di¢ cult to achieve. In each of the boxes of …gure 7 we report, in green, the average growth rate of the region. In many instances, the green line is outside the posterior 90 percent credible set, indicating that the national segmentation of ‡uctuations is not expected to disappear in the near future. Second, while there are changes in the way cyclical ‡uctuations are transmitted from the main EU countries to the area, they are not easily reconciled with either a pure convergence or a pure decoupling view of cyclical ‡uctuations. Both phenomena seem to be contemporaneously present in Mediterranean, but more importantly, both appear to be local and temporary. Thus, also in this aspect, the Mediterranean di¤ers from the broad international trends described, e.g., in Kose and Prasad, 2010. Third, if the current state persists, global cyclical convergence is unlikely to occur and even regional convergence will be di¢ cult to obtain. There will be readjustments in the years to come, with Mediterranean EU countries su¤ering for quite a long time and countries in the east quickly returning to above average growth rates. However, GDP cycles are not expected to become more similar in the years to come.
Some robustness analysis
The policy implications of these facts are numerous. For example, the presence of large heterogeneities and their persistence, despite the recent integration e¤orts by the EU, cast doubts about the e¤ectiveness of the UFM partnership, at least in the current format. Many countries in the Mediterranean live out of tourism revenues and remittances and fostering mobility more than intensifying trade or …nancial ties may help to make business cycles more alike in the area. The fact that idiosyncratic features matter and that their relative weight is expected to be unchanged in the near future is also important. Whether this is a good or a bad news for policy depends on whether one has in mind some regional insurance mechanism (idiosyncrasies are good) or a currency area mechanism (idiosyncrasies are bad). No matter which view is taken, the process of integration and shared prosperity, envisioned by the UFM partnership, appears to have still a long way to go to materialize.
Our analysis also has important implications for theoretical models of the international business cycles. For example, the fact that cross di¤erences in business cycle ‡uctuations do not appear to be related with natural resources, production structures, …nancial market frictions or di¤erences in the productivity process cast doubts on theories which try to explain international di¤erences in business cycles with TFP or market structure di¤erences. Moreover, the fact that cycles in the major macroeconomic variables are driven by idiosyncratic forces in a number of countries is also a major setback for current models of business cycle where consumption smoothing is a priority for risk averse agents in the face of ‡uctuating income. To understand the nature of cyclical ‡uctuations in the area current models need to be modi…ed in many directions -for example, they need to be highly disaggregated and with important national speci…cities -and the role of tourism and remittances explicitly taken into account. In the model with two common factors, one loads on the variables of countries adopting the 
